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Earmarking is a form of bundling in which government adopts a
tax policy while specifying the uses of the revenue. This paper explores
how bundling can enhance eﬃciency: it can inform the public of the
quality of a program proposed, or of the quality of the agency that will
be responsible for designing and implementing the program.We show
that policies that appear ineﬃcient in isolation may become justiﬁed
when bundled.
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11 Introduction
Governments sometimes bundle policies in ways that may appear ineﬃcient.
One important example is earmarking–at the time government imposes a
tax, it speciﬁes the uses of the revenue. Such bundling has two disadvan-
tages. First, it limits the ﬂexibility of government; government for example,
may ﬁnd itself with money to spare for building rural roads at a time when
it cannot aﬀord to improve rail infrastructure. Another example is the im-
position of a road toll where the money must be spent on public transport
by the local transport agency even if these projects fail a cost-beneﬁt test.
The second disadvantage is that bundling can make it diﬃcult to monitor
an agent. For example, Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) show that
accountability and eﬀort could decrease when multiple missions are allocated
to one agency.
In the face of such ineﬃciency why is bundling common? This paper
proposes an explanation. Consider a principal (say the voters, Congress, or
a prime minister) who must decide whether to approve a policy proposed by
an agent (say a governmental agency). Adopting the proposed policy may be
more attractive the more competent the agency or oﬃcial in charge, but the
principal is unsure about the agent’s competence, and desires to learn about
it. Suppose the principal can evaluate the quality of a policy in one area
(called M, for Monitored), but not in another (called N, for Not monitored),
and that the agency’s competence across the two areas is correlated. Then
the principal may approve policy N only if it is bundled with policy M.
This bundling allows the principal to better estimate the quality of policy
N than when N is proposed alone. The rest of the paper explores this idea.
For concreteness, we shall speak of earmarking a toll or tax revenue for a
transportation project.
A large literature of course considers bundling of policies, and the prac-
tice of logrolling to build coalitions has long been recognized. The relevant
literature is discussed below. But we note here two puzzles left unexplained
by that literature. One is the problem of commitment—why does a future
government abide by earmarking set by a previous government? Second, why
does earmarking often take the form of spending tax revenue on programs
that closely relate to the source of the revenue?
21.1 Examples of earmarking
Explanations must also consider when earmarking, or more generally bundling,
occurs. Consider the area of transportation, where data on earmarking are
more readily available than in other areas. The revenue raised from the con-
gestion toll in London is used to improve public transportation. Revenues
from cordon tolls in Norway are dedicated to improving transportation. In
Germany, the revenues from the toll on trucks is supposed to ﬁnance trans-
portation investments. And in the United States, an airport is allowed to
levy a passenger facility charge to ﬁnance airport-related improvements.
In contrast, despite the almost universal use of the income tax to collect
general revenues, income taxes are rarely earmarked to fund public transport
systems. An important exception is the “Versement Transport” in France.
An earlier case of earmarking is Vienna, Austria, which in 1970 was autho-
rized to use the revenue from an employer tax to ﬁnance the construction of
its subway. Such a charge has not been levied in other Austrian cities. A
similar employee tax was introduced in Portland and Eugene, Oregon in the
United States from 1970, but not elsewhere in the country.1
Perhaps the rarity is not surprising, given the disadvantages of earmark-
ing. These include (i) hampering eﬀective budgetary control; (ii) misallocat-
ing funds, giving excess revenues to some functions while others are under
supported; (iii) making the revenue structure inﬂexible; (iv) infringing on
the policy-making powers of state executives and legislatures,2 (v) making it
more diﬃcult to monitor a governmental agency.
2 Literature
A ﬁne survey of the theoretical and empirical literature on earmarking is Bird
and Jun (2005). They make the important distinction between symbolic and
substantive earmarking. Substantive earmarking has the earmarked revenues
ﬂow into a special fund, constituting the sole (or at least the incremental)
source of funding for a particular spending program. Symbolic earmarking,
though nominally tying the revenue source to a spending program, eﬀectively
makes no such link. For example, tolls on a highway may merely substitute
for general fund revenues used to maintain highways. The model we give
1The information in this paragraph is based on Faber (2000).
2This list comes from Deran (1965).
3below can explain both types of earmarking.
2.1 Demand revelation
Much of the literature on earmarking focuses on substantive earmarking.
Thus, one rationale for earmarking is to reveal taxpayer preferences for the
public service. (The seminal work is Buchanan (1963).) Earmarked revenues,
however, signal demand only if the goods are excludable, so that a citizen
who pays lower fees or taxes knows he will receive less of the good. That
connection fails to hold for many goods provided by government.
A recent, game-theoretic, analysis of demand revelation, which considers
monitoring by taxpayers, is given by Dhillon and Perroni (2001). In their
model a spending agency has private information about costs it incurs, and
citizens can, at a cost, monitor the agency. A citizen’s beneﬁt from monitor-
ing is the reduction in the agency’s costs, which reduces the taxes he pays.
They show that when diﬀerent individuals monitor diﬀerent agencies, some
of the free-rider problems in monitoring can be overcome.
Another paper which sees substantive earmarking as facilitating monitor-
ing is Bos (2000). He considers a parliament which monitors a taxing agency
and a spending agency, with the agencies having private information. Ear-
marking is part of an incentive contract which induces the agencies to reveal
their private information.
2.2 Electoral considerations
The papers just cited consider a social planner, with earmarking having no
redistributive consequences. But when people diﬀer in their preferences, ear-
marking that constrains future policy can increase political support for a
policy. For example, an earmarked excise tax on chemical stocks levied to
ﬁnance the clean-up of toxic chemicals can appeal to jurisdictions already
suﬀering from pollution, and to jurisdictions which anticipate a need for en-
vironmental clean up (Teja (1988)). Focusing on a diﬀerent political problem,
Anesi (2006) shows how a political party can use earmarking to remove an
issue from an election, or how avoidance of earmarking can keep an issue
alive, to the beneﬁt of an incumbent with a popular position on that issue.
(A similar idea, though not discussing earmarking, is found in Glazer and
Lohmann (1999).) Brett and Keen (2000) consider earmarking as a way for
a good politician to reveal his type by promising not to waste tax revenue
4even if this earmarking has an eﬃciency cost: a bad politician who wants to
waste the money will never commit to earmarking.
2.3 Compensation
Earmarking may sometimes arise because it oﬀers appropriate compensation.
Direct compensation can be unpopular: compensated losers feel that their
votes are being bought (the “bribe eﬀect”) to allow the wealthy to beneﬁt
from the goods which are thereby made available (see Frey and Oberholzer-
Gee (1996); Kunreuther and Easterling (1996)). To give a speciﬁc example,
Kunreuther and Easterling (1996) consider attitudes by respondents towards
a nuclear waste facility. Direct payments to individuals harmed (for example,
by tax rebates) were regarded as the least important measure; providing
“large grants for community facilities” or “a high-tech project with new jobs”
were deemed more eﬀective than were direct payments. The importance of
remaining in the same dimension is borne out in surveys that ask road users
how to allocate the revenues from road pricing schemes. Increases in road
investments are by far the most popular measure (Verhoef et al., (1997)).
In the public view, reduced accessibility to roads ought to be compensated
with improvements of the road network. In contrast, the public views a
reduction in general taxes as a bad allocation of road revenues. Thus, a
program that harms some people may be politically more palatable if coupled
with a program that beneﬁts those harmed, and we would observe a form of
bundling.
3 Span of control
Earmarking often has the same agency which collects some revenue being
responsible for using it on some program. A more general phenomenon is
bundling—one agency is responsible for several programs or projects. Which
projects should be assigned to an agency relates to the literature on the span
of control within a bureaucracy.
Filson (2000) considers removal of managers found to be of low quality,
and how much resources to allocate to managers of diﬀerent estimated qual-
ity. Our model diﬀers from his in two main ways. First, he does not let an
increased span of control improve the information available about an agent’s
quality. Second, he focuses on retention or replacement of managers rather
5than on which projects to adopt.
A diﬀerent approach, which we ignore, examines how the span of control
aﬀects a manager’s incentives.3
Several papers study how the internal organization of ﬁrms can aﬀect
information about the ability of agents. Berkovitch, Israel, and Tolkowsky
(1999) study when economic units should be structured as stand-alone ﬁrms
versus an integrated ﬁrm (conglomerate): an integrated ﬁrm better con-
trols agency problems through yardstick competition between managers for
project acceptance, but reduces the ability to receive division-speciﬁc project
information from the market. On yardstick competition (how performance
by one agent reveals information about the ability of another agent), see
Besley and Case (1995). Related arguments about how the success of policy
reveals information about an agent’s competence are found in Rogoﬀ and
Sibert (1988), in Rogoﬀ (1990), and in Glazer and Hassin (1988)). And, of
course, our approach relates to signaling, in which an agent engages in a
costly action to reveal his ability.
Meyers (1994) analyzes optimal task assignment when a ﬁrm needs to
learn the abilities of employees, and when production requires the participa-
tion of a senior worker and a junior worker. If each of the two juniors divides
his time equally between the two projects (the “junior-sharing mode”), then
the project outcomes are very informative about which senior is more able,
because the total contributions of the juniors to the two projects are perfectly
correlated. On the other hand, the project outcomes provide no information
about which junior is abler. If, instead, each junior works exclusively on
one project (the “no-sharing mode”), then project outcomes provide more
information about the relative abilities of juniors and less information about
the relative abilities of seniors.
Dewatripont et al. (1999) use a career concern model to study the perfor-
mance of government agencies. They ﬁnd that allocating more tasks to one
oﬃcial typically weakens the link between his performance and his talent,
and so reduces the agent’s eﬀort. The eﬀort will be especially reduced if the
agency’s mission (the objective the agency gives itself) becomes fuzzy. The
major problem is that a government oﬃcial has diﬃculty revealing his talent
when he must perform several tasks. The poorer revelation may even lead a
3The idea that agents’ incentives are weaker when they incompletely control asset
allocation decisions builds on work by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart (1995), and Aghion
and Tirole (1997).
6high-ability agent to refuse some tasks.
4 Bundling for information
We turn next to our explanation, which considers a principal who desires to
learn about the agent’s competence in one area by evaluating his competence
in a related area.
We view earmarks as a tie-in which provides information about the com-
petence of the oﬃcial. For example, suppose the Department of Transporta-
tion proposes a congestion toll, arguing that it is socially eﬃcient. To know
that, the Department must estimate demand, congestibility, and so on. Vot-
ers are unsure about how much the Department knows. So in addition to
the congestion toll, the Department proposes some other program (such as
spending on highway construction), which the voters can evaluate. Are the
bottlenecks that the Department proposes the ones of greatest concern to
consumers? And once the highway project is built, are the roads closed at
the times which cause the least damage to drivers? Since voters know these
eﬀects, they can estimate the quality of the Department. They may favor
the congestion toll combined with the other plan if they ﬁnd that the De-
partment built highways eﬃciently. But they may oppose a congestion toll
if that is the only policy the Department proposes.
To be more explicit, suppose nature determines whether the government
oﬃcial (the agent) is of high quality (good) or of low quality (bad). The
prior probability that the agent is good is γ. The probability a good agent
proposes a good policy is πG; the probability a bad agent proposes a good
policy is πB < πG. Policy can come in two areas, M and N. The principal
(for example, the public, or a legislator) can evaluate the quality of a policy
proposal in area M, but not a proposal in area N.
Let SG be the principal’s observation that policy M is good (or that the
principal observed a Good signal). Then the posterior probability that the






πGγ + πB(1 − γ)
. (1)
Thus the probability that policy N will be good given that policy M was
seen to be good is the probability that the agent was revealed as good times
7πG, plus the probability that the agent was revealed as bad times πB:
πGγ





πGγ + πB(1 − γ)
!
πB. (2)
In contrast, with no bundling, and policy N adopted with no observation of
M, the probability that N will be well implemented is
γπG + (1 − γ)πB. (3)
4.1 The beneﬁts of bundling
We can then ask for the beneﬁt of observing the outcome of policy M. Let
the beneﬁt from policy M when it is good be MG, and let its beneﬁt be MB
when it is bad. Deﬁne NG and NB similarly. Note that MB or MG may
be negative. Then with no observation of policy M, expected beneﬁts from
policy N are
(γπG + (1 − γ)πB)NG + (1 − (γπG + (1 − γ)πB))NB. (4)
Now suppose that policy N is adopted only if policy M is observed to be
good. The expected beneﬁts from policy M are
(γπG + (1 − γ)πB)MG + (1 − (γπG + (1 − γ)πB))MB. (5)
Policy N will then be adopted if policy M is observed to be good. With
probability γπG+(1−γ)πB policy M is observed to be good and policy N is
adopted. Given that policy N is adopted, with probability
πGγ
πGγ+πB(1−γ) the
agent is good. With probability one minus this the agent is bad. Thus the
expected beneﬁt from policy N, when it is adopted only if policy M is good,
is
(γπG + (1 − γ)πB) (6)
 
πGγ
πGγ + πB(1 − γ)
(πGNG + (1 − πG)NB) + (1 −
πGγ
πGγ + πB(1 − γ)
)(πBNG + (1 − πB)NB)
!
.
Summarizing, under no bundling, the the adoption of M is independent of
the adoption of N. Expected beneﬁts are then:
Max[(γπG + (1 − γ)πB)NG + (1 − (γπG + (1 − γ)πB))NB,0]+ (7)
8Max[(γπG + (1 − γ)πB)MG + (1 − (γπG + (1 − γ)πB))MB,0].
Under bundling, the beneﬁts are either 0 (when neither M nor N are adopted,
or the beneﬁts from M alone (when it turns out bad and so N is not adopted),
or the beneﬁts from both M and N (when M turns out good and so N is
adopted). Expected beneﬁts are then
Max[(γπG+(1−γ)πB)MG+(1−(γπG+(1−γ)πB))MB +(γπG + (1 − γ)πB)
(8)  
πGγ
πGγ + πB(1 − γ)
(πGNG + (1 − πG)NB) + (1 −
πGγ
πGγ + πB(1 − γ)




To gain insight into the beneﬁts of bundling we make simplifying assump-
tions. Let a bad project be the exact opposite of a good project, or let
NB = −NG. Normalize NG = 1. Let the probability that a bad agent pro-
poses a good policy be zero (πB = 0). Lastly, suppose that project M and
project N are each, in isolation, worthwhile in expected terms (the values
of expressions (4) and (5) are positive). As it is now anyway worthwhile to
undertake project M, the net beneﬁt of bundling, ∆, equals the diﬀerence
between expressions (6) and (4):
∆ = 2γπ
2
G − 3γπG + 1, (9)
with ∂∆
∂γ ≤ 0 and ∂∆
∂πG = γ (4πG − 3).
The net beneﬁt of bundling, ∆, declines with γ: the smaller is the share
of good agents, the higher the beneﬁt of knowing the type of the agent before
deciding on project N. When πG = 1 (a good agent always adopts a good
project), the outcome of project M perfectly predicts the type of the agent.
The net beneﬁt of bundling becomes (1 − γ). A decline in πG reduces the
beneﬁt of bundling: the false negatives reduce the information value from
seeing the outcome of project M.4
Sometimes bundling is inadvisable (or put diﬀerently, project N should
be adopted even if project M turned out bad). A suﬃcient condition to
have a net beneﬁt in our stylized case is that γ ≤ 0.88.5 The net beneﬁt
4The net beneﬁt of bundling reaches a minimum at πG = 3/4.
5This result can be seen by setting πG = 3/4, the value that minimizes ∆, and solving
the equation ∆ = 0 for the corresponding γ.
9of bundling can become negative when γ is high and πG < 1. The loss can
occur because bundling means erroneously rejecting project N when project
M turns out bad.
Note that for bundling to be worthwhile, neither project M nor N, when
considered in isolation need be beneﬁcial in expected terms. Consider ﬁrst
the case where the “informative” project M has a negative expected beneﬁt
Γ. Then we need to add this cost to our net beneﬁt of bundling ∆ as given
by (9) to know whether bundling is worthwhile. What matters is then not
only the relative cost Γ but also the value of ∆; this value depends on γ and
πG; the lower is γ and the higher is πG the more informative project M will
be, and the greater the gains from bundling.
Consider next a project N that, in isolation, has a negative expected
beneﬁt (the value in expression (4) is negative). The expected beneﬁt from
bundling now becomes
∆N = γπG (2πG − 1) − Γ. (10)
A necessary condition for this expression to be positive is that πG > 1/2:
only when the information of project M on the type of the agent has a high
probability of generating a good N project is the information valuable. The
net beneﬁt of project N in isolation ((2γπG − 1) is negative; if πG > 1/2 then
γ must be suﬃciently small to make bundling worthwhile. A small value of γ,
is precisely what we would expect to make information revelation via project
M worthwhile. Obviously, there are no miracles; a negative expected beneﬁt
for project N can produce a positive beneﬁt when bundled; but the expected
beneﬁt will remain small as the beneﬁts appear only when good agents are
rare.
Also note that our approach can apply to symbolic earmarking, rather
than only to substantive earmarking—the information provided by policy M
does not require that revenue raised from policy M fund policy N. And
note that our approach does require that the two policies (M and N) be
connected in the sense that the agent’s performance in one area gives some
useful information about his performance in another area. So an agency’s
proposal about where to build highways may be informative about its com-
petence in a related area, how to price congestion, whereas the connection
between highway constructions and social security taxes is weak. We would
therefore predict earmarking to be more appealing in one case than in the
other.
10Moreover, our argument suggests that agencies should not be specialized,
but instead be given a bundle of responsibilities so that the principal can use
performance on projects he can evaluate to predict performance on projects
which are harder to evaluate.
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145 Notation
πG Probability a good oﬃcial proposes a good policy
πB Probability a good oﬃcial proposes a good policy
γ Prior probability that worker is good
15